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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The jurisdiction is proper before this Court under the 
provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to 
set the amount of alimony based upon the parties' standard 
of living prior to separation, rather than on the standard 
of living considering the parties' respective incomes at 
time of trial. 
II. Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to 
declare the home, currently titled in the Plaintiff's name, 
as marital property to be divided, rather than to accept the 
quit-claim deed given by Defendant to Plaintiff prior to the 
parties' separation and treat the home as Plaintiff's 
separate property. 
III. Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
deny Plaintiff an award of attorney's fees where the income 
of the parties showed her need for such an award, the 
reasonableness of the fees was undisputed and the 
Defendant's income showed he had the ability to pay her 
attorney fees. 
IV. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in denying judgment 
interest on payments to Plaintiff upon a judgment for 
temporary alimony awarded to her prior to the trial herein. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Joy Hoagland (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed an action 
for divorce against her husband, Colin Hoagland (hereinafter 
"Defendant") on August 28. 1989. Record, p. 001. This case was 
tried before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Court Judge, 
on the 28th day of October, 1991. Trial Transcript, p. 1. The 
court took the matter under advisement and issued its Memorandum 
Decision on the 7th day of November,, 1991. jR^ , p. 272. 
Thereafter, counsel for Defendant prepared the initial Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as the Decree of Divorce. 
R. p. 293. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the 
Decree of Divorce, were entered with the Court on the 4th day of 
December, 1991. R^ pp. 293, 303. Plaintiff filed her Objection 
to Entry of Findings of Fact on December 12, 1991, R^, p. 307, 
leading to the eventual filing of the Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, R^ p. 335, and a Second Amended Findings 
of Fact. R^ p. 355. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, Nevada on 
September 5, 1973. Tr. p. 7. When they were first married, they 
resided in Plaintiff's house in Ogden for approximately two 
years. Tr. pp. 11-12. In 1975, the Defendant convinced the 
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Plaintiff to sell her house and use the equity money of the 
Plaintiff's house to purchase another house. Tr. p. 15. In 
1978, Defendant and Plaintiff decided to start a family 
partnership to run a grocery business. Tr. p. 117. That 
partnership consisted of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the 
Defendant's brother, and the Plaintiff's son. Tr. p. 118. The 
business was so successful that they added two more stores. Tr. 
p. 123. During this time, the Plaintiff was working as a 
bookkeeper^and a checker at the stores. Tr. p. 29. At one point, 
the Defendant did not want the Plaintiff to work at the stores, 
because Defendant had a girlfriend, "Kay," that worked there. 
Tr., p. 31. The Plaintiff was told by the Defendant that "he 
didn't want any part of my [Plaintiff's] hc^e, and he wanted me 
[Plaintiff] out of the business." Tr. p. 2-?. 
In May 1986, the Defendant wanted to incorporate the 
business. Tr. pp. 32, 122. The Plaintiff was already out of the 
store (i.e., she was told not to work there), and the Defendant 
desired to buy out Defendant's ownership interest in the 
business. He told the Plaintiff that he would give her a quit-
claim deed to the house in exchange for her ownership interest in 
the business. Tr. p. 32. Both before and after the quit-claim 
deed was signed and recorded, there had been no creditors 
HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND Case No. 920340-CA 
Appellant's Brief 
-4-
contacting the Plaintiff. Tr. p. 33. At approximately the same 
time the quit-claim deed was given to her, two corporations were 
formed with the assets of the partnership. Tr. p. 121. In the 
Fall of 1986, the corporations filed for bankruptcy. Tr. p. 122. 
Just prior to the bankruptcy, the Defendant and his brother 
brought between eight and nine thousand dollars in cash into 
Plaintiff's home. Tr. pp. 18-20. 
In January 1987, the Defendant moved to Las Vegas, 
Nevada to accept a position with Smith's Management. Tr. p. 8. 
In April 1987, Defendant invited Plaintiff to fly down to Nevada 
to see him. Tr. pp. 9-10. During that trip, Defendant told 
Appellant that he would be in Nevada one more week, and then come 
back home. Tr. p. 10. He later decided not to come home, but 
rather that they should get a divorce. 
In April 1989, Plaintiff had to get a job as a seasonal 
employee with the Internal Revenue Service. Tr. p. 44. 
The divorce action was filed by the Plaintiff on August 
29, 1989. R^ p. 1. Defendant was served with a Summons and a 
Complaint and with an Order to Show Cause for temporary support. 
R. pp. 5-10. Defendant filed an answer to the complaint and a 
counterclaim. FL_ p. 27. A hearing on the Order to Show Cause 
pertaining to temporary support was held. R^_ p. 11. The 
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Defendant did not appear at the Hearing, and did not file any 
responsive pleadings thereto. Id. Temporary alimony was awarded 
to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,500 per month. FL_ pp. 22-26. 
At the time of trial, the Defendant owed to the Plaintiff back 
alimony in the amount of $27,507.00. R^ p. 359. Of this amount, 
$21,935.00 had been reduced to judgment in a hearing held five 
months prior to trial. jR^  pp. 152-156. 
After trial on this matter, the Second District Court 
awarded to the Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce, FL_ p. 303, and in 
the Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, held, inter alia, that the standard of living the parties 
enjoyed during the marriage would be determined as of the time of 
separation instead of as of the time of trial, R^ p. 274; that 
the home was a marital asset rather than an asset solely of the 
Plaintiff, R^ p. 276; that the parties were to pay their own 
attorney's fees, R^ p. 277; and that the back alimony owed to the 
Plaintiff by the Defendant could be paid in payments without 
interest, R^ pp. 276-277. The Plaintiff then brought this 
Appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCREITON FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO SET THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY BASED 
UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD OF LIVING PRIOR TO 
SEPARATION, RATHER THAN ON THE STANDARD OF LIVING 
CONSIDERING THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE INCOMES AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL. 
Utah precedents indicate that where a divorce involves 
parties that were married for a long time and where the husband's 
income rose dramatically between separation and trial, that the 
appropriate standard of living is to be determined at the time of 
trial, basically asking what the standard of living would have 
been had they remained together. Further, the imperative to 
determine the value of marital assets at the time of trial is 
upheld by this analysis. 
II. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED 
IN THE PLAINTIFF'S NAME, AS MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE 
DIVIDED, RATHER THAN TO ACCEPT THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
GIVEN BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO THE 
PARTIES' SEPARATION AND TREAT THE HOME AS 
PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires that where a 
party (here, the Defendant) has taken a position as to property 
in court, and has received a benefit from that position, that he 
cannot then change his position in a later court hearing. 
Defendant has done just that by saying he transferred the house 
to the Plaintiff's name to avoid exposure in a Bankruptcy action, 
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and now wants to receive an interest in the house. Further, when 
he transferred the house to his wife's name, he received a 
benefit -- the Plaintiff's interest in the family business. He 
should not now benefit from what, in hindsight, appears to be a 
bad deal on his part. 
III. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO DENY PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE THE INCOME OF THE PARTIES 
SHOWED HER NEED FOR SUCH AN AWARD, THE 
REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES WAS UNDISPUTED AND THE 
DEFENDANT'S INCOME SHOWED HE HAD THE ABILITY TO 
PAY HER ATTORNEY FEES. 
The Utah courts have listed the standard under which 
attorney's fees are awarded, and have made it imperative that the 
trial court make certain definite findings of fact prior to 
coming to its award of attorney's fees. The trial court did not 
make the specific findings, and had the court made those specific 
findings, it should have then awarded attorney's fees to the 
Plaintiff. 
IV. WHETHER OF NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
JUDGMENT INTEREST ON PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF UPON A 
JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED TO HER 
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN. 
The case of Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Ut.App. 
1987), aff'd 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988) is simply one example that 
interest on a judgment is a right, and not within the discretion 
of a trial court. When the trial court ordered the Defendant to 
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pay to the Plaintiff back alimony owed, it abused its discretion 
when it further ordered that the back alimony, which had been 
reduced to several final orders, could be paid without interest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
SET THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY BASED UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD 
OF LIVING PRIOR TO SEPARATION, RATHER THAN ON THE STANDARD 
OF LIVING CONSIDERING THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE INCOMES AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL,. 
The standard of review accepted by the Utah Supreme 
Court regarding alimony is: 
We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on 
alimony as long as the court "exercises its discretion 
within the bounds and under the standards we have set 
and has supported its decision with adequate findings 
and conclusions." Naranio v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 
1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988)). 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 (Ut.App. 1991, -emphasis added). 
It has been noted by this Court that "[conclusions of 
law, however, are reviewed for correctness and given no special 
deference on appeal." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 
(Ut.App. 1991). See also Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 
(Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct.App. 
1990) . 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving 
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living 
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enjoyed during the marriage and prevent the spouse from becoming 
a public charge." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986) 
and Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). See also 
Bushnell v. Bushnell, 649 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1982) (same standard 
used regarding temporary support). 
The case of Howell v. Howell, supra, is a case that 
contains many parallels to the instant case, and should be 
regarded closely. In Howell, during the last five years of the 
marriage, the Plaintiff's income was five thousand, six hundred 
dollars ($5,600) per month, and was at that level when the 
parties separated. However, at the time of trial two years 
later, Plaintiff's income had raised to ten thousand, one hundred 
and twenty dollars ($10,120) per month. This Court found that 
the large salary increase was due in part to the Plaintiff and 
Defendant "having persevered during the lean times", id. at 1212; 
much as it was likely the Defendant's experience owning his own 
stores that led to his being given the position with Smith's 
Management in 1987. 
This Court in Howell also held, under the fact 
situation before it, that it was inequitable to fix alimony based 
simply upon the income at the time of separation. First, this 
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Court held that looking to the time of trial, rather than another 
time, given the facts presented, 
can properly address what situation would have existed 
if the parties had not separated earlier. In this 
case, post separation substantial increase in 
plaintiff's income was akin to a deferred income. In 
light of the facts of this case, we conclude that the 
trial court erred in looking at the pre-separation 
standard of living in setting alimony, but should have 
instead considered the standard of living "during the 
marriage" up to the time of trial. 
Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212 (emphasis added). 
In much the same way, in the instant case, the 
Defendant was not making much money during the marriage to the 
Plaintiff -- their own comparable "lean times" -- but after 
moving out of the family home (but prior to requesting a 
divorce), Plaintiff began making much better money working for 
Smith's Management Corp -- a kind of deferred income. His 
highest salary was in 1990, when he made $73,302 from Smith's. 
Tr., p. 12 9. Income at the time of trial, less because of his 
arthritis condition necessitating a job change within Smith's, 
was approximately $56,000 per year, more than double the average 
salary earned during the marriage of $500 per week. 
The Howell decision emphasized several sources as 
precedent in coming to their decision on alimony. One case 
cited, Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), discussed 
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how alimony should try to "equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living enjoyed during the marriage." Id. at 1081. 
In attempting to equalize the standards of living of the 
litigants in their case, this Court in Howell compared the 
incomes of the two parties as awarded at the time of separation, 
and at the time of trial. 
In the instant case, if you subtract the trial court's 
award of alimony to the Plaintiff, Defendant will still be making 
$44,000 per year (not including bonuses), as compared to 
Plaintiff's $13,380.00 per year she makes working for the 
Internal Revenue Service (plus alimony as awarded by the court). 
It is clear that the wide void between the Defendant's income and 
the Plaintiff's income is in no way equalized if one takes the 
standard of living as being at the time of trial. 
Other factors that this Court looked at in the Howell 
decision was the fact that the marriage was long-term; the 
Plaintiff was "approximately fifty years old, has minimal job 
skills," and has worked in the house during most of the marriage; 
that the Plaintiff's likelihood of achieving significant salary 
levels was slim; and, given these, Plaintiff was only capable of 
earning $625.00 per month. 
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The fact situation in Howell is remarkably close to 
that of the instant case in each of the above-mentioned factors. 
At the time of trial, Plaintiff was 56 years of age, Tr. p. 2, 
and had been married to the Defendant for eighteen years, R^ p. 
273. The Defendant's earning capacity (currentLy over $4,500 per 
month) far exceeds the Plaintiff's earning capacity ($1,115 per 
month). Given her age and marketable skills, it is unlikely the 
Plaintiff will be capable of earning more than she is now. The 
parallels are such that Howell should be used for determination 
of the standard of living, e.g. at the time of trial. 
Further, Defendant seems to miss the entire reason for 
determining alimony from the time of trial rather than from the 
time of separation: judicial economy. As the Howell court 
pointed out, fixing alimony at the time of trial "is further 
justified because any future changes in alimony are limited to 
instances where a material change in circumstance has occurred." 
Id. at 1212. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that, in similar 
fact situations, the standard of living should be placed at a 
later time rather than simply "during the marriage." In Savage 
v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Court stated: 
Where a marriage is of long duration and the earning 
capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds that of the 
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other, as here, it is appropriate to order alimony and 
child support at a level that will insure that the' 
supported spouse and children may maintain a standard 
of living not unduly disproportionate to that which 
they would have enjoyed had the marriage continued. 
Savacre v. Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205 (emphasis added) . See also 
Naranio v. Naranio, supra at 1147 (Utah App. 1988) . 
Again, note the factual similarities: the instant case 
deals with a marriage of long duration (18 years), and the 
earning capacity of the Defendant greatly exceeds that of the 
Plaintiff (over $4,500 per month vs. $1,115 per month). 
The reason that the precise definition of "standard of 
living enjoyed by the parties during marriage" is not frequently 
a problem is that the standard of living at the time of trial is 
usually comparable to that which existed during the marriage. 
However, the standard that is coming from the appellate courts 
leads to a conclusion that long-term marriages in which the 
earnings of one of the parties greatly increases, while the other 
party has few or no marketable skills, places the point at which 
the standard of living is determined at the time of trial. 
It should also be noted that determining the standard 
of living at the time of trial is consistent with the requirement 
that marital assets be valued at the time of trial. Berger v. 
Berber, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). See also Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
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So not only in the interest of justice, but also in the 
interest of judicial economy and in response to the requirements 
that the Utah appellate courts have placed on the determination 
of alimony in cases with similar facts to the instant case, 
Plaintiff requests this Court to order alimony to be set 
according to the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial. 
II. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED IN THE PLAINTIFF'S NAME, 
AS MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE DIVIDED, RATHER THAN TO ACCEPT THE 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED GIVEN BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO THE 
PARTIES' SEPARATION AND TREAT THE HOME AS PLAINTIFF'S 
SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
The facts of this case make the distribution of 
property, particularly the determination that the Plaintiff's 
home is a marital asset, clearly erroneous. 
When the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 
September of 1973, they lived in a house owned by the Plaintiff. 
Later, the Defendant convinced the Plaintiff to sell her house 
and invest the equity into the house which Plaintiff still 
inhabits. In 1978, the Plaintiff and Defendant decided to start 
a family partnership to start a grocery business. That 
partnership consisted of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the 
Defendant's brother, and the Plaintiff's son. Later, when the 
Defendant wanted to incorporate the business, he told the 
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Plaintiff that he would give her a quit-claim deed to the house 
in exchange for her ownership interest in the business. The 
quit-claim deed was given to her at approximately the same time 
the business was incorporated. 
The Doctrines of Judicial and Quasi Estoppel bar the 
defendant from claiming any interest in the house due to the fact 
that he quitclaimed the house to his wife in exchange for her 
interest in the business he was running. His stated reason for 
doing this was so that he could avoid having to list it as an 
asset during the bankruptcy of the business. He testified that, 
when the business was still a partnership, Utah Bank and Trust 
wanted him to give it a lien on the house as collateral on the 
debt owed by the partnership. Tr. p. 122. It was at that point 
that he decided that "I could see the bankruptcy coming and 
that's when I decided to form the corporate [sic] and quitclaim 
the house to my wife." Tr. p. 122. Creditors did go after his 
brother's house after he pledged it as collateral for the debts, 
and his brother lost the house. Tr. p. 123. By thus disclaiming 
any interest in the property in his bankruptcy action, he was 
able to save the house from creditors of the business, which 
received a discharge from indebtedness. To award the defendant 
an interest in property he previously disclaimed would violate 
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the doctrines of judicial and quasi estoppel and would thereby 
allow the defendant to manipulate the legal system in an 
unconscionable manner. The trial court erred in not recognizing 
this in its division of marital assets. 
Judicial Estoppel or estoppel by record is a doctrine 
to protect the integrity of the judicial process from conduct 
such as knowing misrepresentation and fraud upon the court. 
Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1989). See also 
Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 737 n. 6 (8th Cir. 
1987). The Doctrine prevents a party who has obtained relief on 
the basis of a representation in court maintaining the opposite 
position in another action. As summarized by the Utah Supreme 
Court, 
It is well settled that a party who has taken a 
position in prior litigation and has obtained relief on 
the basis of it cannot maintain the opposite position 
in another action. 
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980). See also 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 
App. 1990); Roy S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 551 
P.2d 1259 (Utah 1976); Mecham v. City of Glendale, 15 Ariz.App. 
402, 489 P.2d 65 (Ariz App 1971). 
To allow the Defendant to so change his stance that his 
conduct amounts to defrauding the Bankruptcy court is just the 
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type of action that judicial estoppel as outlined by the Utah 
courts is meant to prevent. Under judicial estoppel, the 
Defendant is estopped from claiming any interest in the house. 
Even if this court finds that judicial estoppel is not 
applicable to the instant case, the case of Hogue v. Hogue, 184 
Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (Ut.App. 1992) is helpful in understanding 
instances when it is appropriate to establish a home as a marital 
asset, and to further distinguish the instant case as an instance 
where it would be inappropriate to do so. The facts in Hogue 
were that Mr. Hogue purchased a piece of property, on which he 
later built a house. It was not until later that he married Mrs. 
Hogue and she moved into the house with him. After the marriage, 
Mr. Hogue quitclaimed the house to Mrs. Hogue, and later declared 
bankruptcy, claiming no interest in the house. Id., 184 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 64. The trial judge declared ,that the house was 
marital property. While this may on the surface have a few 
similarities to the instant case (house quitclaimed to wife, 
etc.), the reasoning used by the trial court leaves no doubt that 
the factual circumstances in Hogue were far different than those 
in the instant case. 
Specifically, the court found that: (1) Mr. Hogue purchased 
the ranch exclusively with money from his business after his 
first divorce and before his second marriage to Mrs. Hogue; 
(2) Mr. and Mrs. Hogue jointly agreed upon the conveyance of 
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the ranch to Mrs. Hogue as a means of protecting the 
property from Mr. Hogue's judgment creditors; (3) 'Mr. and 
Mrs. Hogue cohabitated together at the ranch for several 
months prior to the conveyance of the ranch to Mrs. Hogue; 
(4) Mr. and Mrs. Hogue jointly contracted for the purchase 
of acreage adjoining the ranch, as well as purchasing 
vehicles, trailers, race horses and training and maintenance 
equipment to be used on the ranch; and (5) Mr. and Mrs. 
Hogue resided at and jointly maintained the ranch for 
approximately seven years after the conveyance to Mrs. 
Hogue. 
Id., 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65. 
Neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant purchased the 
house in the instant case prior to the marriage; it was purchased' 
during the marriage. Had Defendant purchased the property and 
house prior to the marriage (as was the case in Hogue), then his 
quit claim may not have as much validity. Further, the facts 
presented at trrial do not support the notion that Plaintiff and 
the Defendant jointly agreed to sign the house over to the 
Plaintiff to protect it from creditors; the record shows that the 
Plaintiff gave up something of value (her share of the 
partnership) in exchange for his portion of the house. While 
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the house during part of the 
marriage, it is clear that one reason the Plaintiff stayed in 
Ogden was that she considered the house her own house, and did 
not want to leave it -- a not altogether unusual response. 
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While the trial court did make a finding that the house 
was transferred in line with Defendant's reasoning, the facts 
presented weighed against it. Again referring to Hogue, the 
appellate court may make changes in the trial court's property 
division determination if, inter alia, "the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings." Id., 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
64, quoting Naranio v. Naranjo, supra at 1146 (Ut.App. 1988) . 
It is clear that in this case the finding that the house was 
deeded only to avoid creditors was clearly erroneous, and should 
be reversed, or remanded for findings of fact in line with the 
evidence presented. 
III. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DENY PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE THE INCOME 
OF THE PARTIES SHOWED HER NEED FOR SUCH AN AWARD, THE 
REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES WAS UNDISPUTED AND THE 
DEFENDANT'S INCOME SHOWED HE HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY HER 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann., grants to the trial 
court the authority to award attorney fees in divorce 
proceedings. This award must be based upon three factors: (1) 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and (3) the reasonableness of 
the requested fees. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 
(Ut.App. 1988). In the case before this Court, the second and 
third points are undisputed by Defendant; the question is factor 
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number one to determine if attorney fees are justified. In 
determining that attorney fees should not be awarded to either 
side, the trial court maintained that with both Plaintiff's 
seasonal employment and her alimony as awarded, she made 
sufficient income to be able to pay her own attorney's fees. R^ 
pp. 3 63-3 64. However, the trial court did not make a 
determination as to reasonableness, and did not address the 
Defendant's ability to pay. The analysis used was not adequate 
to determine that there is no need on the part of the Plaintiff 
for an award of attorney's fees. As this Court has held: 
To permit meaningful review of the trial court's 
discretionary ruling, "[w]e have consistently encouraged 
trial courts to make findings and to explain factors which 
they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee 
award." Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 
1210, 1215 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
• * * 
The trial court in this case gave no explanation for its 
reduction of attorney fees incurred by Wife where their 
reasonableness was uncontroverted. Again, the court's failure 
to address Wife's need or Husband's ability to pay her 
attorney fees leaves us with no adequate explanation for the 
court's award. 
Bell v. Bell, supra at 494 (Ut.App. 1991). 
The trial court's decision to make each party bear their 
own attorney's fees leaves the Plaintiff and this reviewing court 
with no reasonable explanation as to its actions. Utah law 
mandates that the decision of the trial court in this matter was 
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incomplete, and should be reversed or remanded for findings that 
are in line with the requirements handed down from the Utah 
appellate courts. 
IV. WHETHER OF NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF UPON A JUDGMENT FOR 
TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED TO HER PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN. 
According to Utah Code Ann., § 15-1-4, unless otherwise 
specified by contract, "judgments shall bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum." (Emphasis added) . The meaning of "shall" in a 
statute is usually presumed to be mandatory. Herr v. Salt Lake 
County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974); State v. Ziemer, 10 Utah 2d 45, 
347 P.2d 1111 (1960) . Utah Courts have determined that this 
includes alimony judgments. In the case of Stroud v. Stroud, 758 
P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's 
ruling (Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1987)) that 
nterest on final orders on alimony and child support was mandatory. 
The language the couit used was unambiguous: 
First, the plain, unambiguous language of §15-1-4 
[of the Utah Code] prohibits granting the relief 
defendant seeks. Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the 
subject statute provides that unless otherwise specified, 
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of twelve 
percent per annum. 
• • * 
Second, to allow a reduction as defendant wishes 
would thwart the intention of the statute by rewarding 
those who withhold or are delinquent in child support 
payments. This we also will not do. 
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Plaintiff is entitled to the statutory rate of 
interest on the judgment until payment is made in full. 
Stroud, 738 P.2d at 906. 
In ruling in its Memorandum Decision that the Defendant 
can pay back alimony owed without interest, the trial court was in 
clear error. 
Section 15-1-4 is not the only statutory language helpful 
in determining whether judgment interest was improperly withheld by 
the trial court. According to the trial court, at the time of 
trial (October 1991), the Defendant owed the Plaintiff $27,507.00. 
R. p. 359. Of this amount, $21,935.00 had been reduced to 
judgment in a hearing held in May 1991. R^ pp. 152-156. According 
to §30-3-10.6, every time that the Defendant did not pay Plaintiff 
her temporary alimony as ordered, that amount owed would become a 
11
 judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of 
the district court." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6. Since the 
$27,507.00 spoken of by the trial court was owed to date, it was 
clearly arrearages; henceforth, it was obviously late. In that 
case, the Plaintiff, under § 30-3-10.6, had a judgment against the 
Defendant in the amount of $27,507.00 when it was due, not just 
when the court issued the decree of divorce. This Court has 
recently determined that each of these judgments that occur when 
the alimony payment is late is a final judgment, and that interest 
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is due on those arrearages. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 193 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. 1992) . Therefore, in the interests of 
justice, and in compliance with the mandate of Utah statutory law, 
the entire $27,507.00 needs to be paid to the Plaintiff at the 
legal interest rate. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiff 
respectfully requests this Court to remand the final divorce decree 
entered in this case to the trial court for a review of the alimony 
award, the property distribution, the attorney's fees and costs 
award and the payment of interest on the accured back alimony 
payments. 
Plaintiff further requests that she be awarded attorney 
fees and costs on appeal. She has had to bring this appeal to 
defend her property interests at the resolution of this marriage, 
and based upon the foregoing, has not brought this action 
frivilously or without foundation. She is still in need of an 
HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND Case No. 920340-CA 
Appellant's Brief 
-24-
attorney fee award and Defendant has the ability to pay such an 
award. 
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